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Abstract  
Aspect-oriented middleware is a promising technology for the 
realisation of dynamic reconfiguration in heterogeneous distri-
buted systems. However, like other dynamic reconfiguration ap-
proaches, AO-middleware-based reconfiguration requires that the 
consistency of the system is maintained across reconfigurations. 
AO-middleware-based reconfiguration is an ongoing research 
topic and several consistency approaches have been proposed. 
However, most of these approaches tend to be targeted at specific 
contexts, whereas for distributed systems it is crucial to cover a 
wide range of operating conditions. In this paper we propose an 
approach that offers distributed, dynamic reconfiguration in a 
consistent manner, and features a flexible framework-based con-
sistency management approach to cover a wide range of operating 
conditions. We evaluate our approach by investigating the confi-
gurability and transparency of our approach and also quantify the 
performance overheads of the associated consistency mechanisms. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors  D.2.7 11 [Software Engi-
neering]: Distribution, Maintenance, and Enhancement.  
General Terms: Algorithms, Design, Management. 
Keywords: middleware; reflection; aspects; dynamic reconfigura-
tion; consistency. 
1. Introduction 
A key and growing challenge for distributed systems is their need 
to support dynamic reconfiguration in order to maintain optimal 
levels of service in diverse and changing environments. In re-
sponse to this challenge, aspect-oriented middleware [10, 12, 13, 
14, 16, 19] has recently emerged as a promising basis on which to 
build reconfigurable distributed systems. The core concept of AO 
middleware is that of an aspect: a module that deals with one 
specific concern and can be changed independently of other mod-
ules. Aspects are made up of individual code elements that im-
plement the concern (advices). Advices are deployed at multiple 
positions in a system (join points) which are expressed by point-
cuts—a particular form of composition language. 
Dynamic reconfiguration of distributed systems requires as-
surances that the reconfiguration does not leave the system in an 
inconsistent state that can potentially lead to incorrect execution 
or even complete system failure. In AO middleware environments 
reconfiguration inconsistencies arise from a range of characteristic 
sources which we classify under two broad headings: system envi-
ronment related sources and composition related sources. System 
environment related inconsistencies occur due to the runtime sys-
tem environment (e.g. message loss or node crash); whereas com-
position related inconsistencies refer to application-specific 
semantic relationships between modules or aspects (e.g. if one 
aspect is dependent on another than removing the first will result 
in inconsistency; or if two aspects are mutually exclusive then 
deploying both simultaneously will result in inconsistency).  
In general, avoiding these sources of inconsistency is a diffi-
cult task due to the diversity of distributed applications (e.g. cen-
tralised/decentralised, static/mobile, small scale/large scale etc) 
and also because of diverse application-specific factors (e.g. vary-
ing dependability requirements, or varying trade-offs between 
consistency and scalability). Relying on the application developer 
to ensure the consistency of the system is not feasible under such 
heterogeneous conditions. Moreover, a one-size-fits-all approach 
to consistency management is not feasible either. Instead, multiple 
consistency strategies should be supported within a framework-
based approach so that appropriate strategies can be applied to 
each set of arising circumstances.  
Supporting multiple consistency strategies entails meeting the 
following key requirements: 
• Configurability. It must be possible to configure and even 
reconfigure the consistency-related functionality of the sys-
tem.  
• Transparency. Managing reconfiguration across each node is 
a complex and error prone task for the application program-
mer. Achieving consistency must therefore involve minimum 
programmer effort. 
To address the above issues and requirements we propose in this 
paper a distributed consistency framework that ensures consistent 
AO-based dynamic reconfiguration while being tailorable to spe-
cific conditions and environments.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a detailed discussion of the various threats to consistency to 
which distributed applications are prone. In Section 3 we present 
necessary background on the AO composition technology on 
which we base our proposal (i.e. our AO-OpenCom platform). 
Section 4 then presents our distributed consistency framework, 
which is then evaluated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses 
related work, and we offer our conclusions in Section 7. 
2. Threats to Consistency 
To illustrate threats to consistency under dynamic reconfiguration 
in distributed systems we now present a simple case-study (see 
figure 1) which comprises a  multimedia peer to peer network in 
which heterogeneous peers share data files and interact among 
themselves. The peers (laptops, PCs, and PDAs) can also operate 
in different network domains (Internet, Wi-Fi, ad-hoc wireless 
networks, etc.). Given this environment a wide range of dynamic 
reconfiguration scenario are feasible. For example: 
(i) when a new video codec become available we may want to 
encapsulate it as encoder and decoder aspects and dynami-
cally deploy it on all nodes with video capabilities;  
(ii) when nodes move from a fixed to a wireless network envi-
ronment we may want to deploy fragmentation and reassem-
bly of the video and audio media frames; 
(iii) when application performance degrades at a given node we 
want to deploy a cache aspect while ensuring that cache con-
sistency is maintained across nodes.  
We now present important threats to the consistency of such re-
configuration scenarios. While we do not claim this to be an ex-
haustive list, we believe it to be strongly indicative of the 
challenges that must be addressed.  
 
Figure 1. Multimedia application case study scenario 
2.1 System environment threats  
These relate to reconfiguration inconsistencies that occur due to 
the instability of the underlying distributed environment in which 
the reconfiguration takes place. The inherently unstable characte-
ristics of the networks and nodes employed in the scenario in-
crease the chances that a reconfiguration will be compromised. 
These threat include: 
Protocol message disruptions. If reconfiguration-related messag-
es are lost, re-ordered, duplicated or delayed, the consistency of 
the reconfiguration is clearly compromised. For example, as mes-
sages get lost, the initiating node (referred as the coordinator) of 
the reconfiguration can be mislead into waiting for the reconfigu-
ration to complete. 
Local node disruptions. The reconfiguration requests (i) to (iii) 
sent by the initiator of the reconfiguration may not reach some of 
the peer nodes. Even if the messaging is unproblematic, individual 
nodes may still fail to apply a requested reconfiguration. For ex-
ample: 
• the node may be overloaded or may crash;  
• a aspect composition request may fail because of resource 
scarcity on the target node or because the node’s local policy 
forbids it to make the requested change; 
• modules or aspects may still be performing computations 
when an attempt is made to remove or recompose them. 
Again, such factors can lead to parts of the intended reconfigura-
tion not being carried out, and consequent inconsistency.  
Infrastructure service failures. Aspects to be reconfigured into 
the system are typically stored in repositories which may get con-
gested with requests, or crash, meaning that aspects may not be 
available to be deployed (or may perhaps be only deployable in 
parts of the system). Additionally, different repository instances 
may have different versions of the aspects: e.g. different versions 
of the encryption aspects may be produced over time, so that dif-
ferent nodes configure different codec versions and be inconsis-
tent with one another.  
Simultaneous reconfigurations. Different reconfiguration re-
quests may arise simultaneously so that reconfiguration-related 
messages relating to distinct requests may be interleaved and po-
tentially be received in different orders at different nodes. For 
example, one request might ask for a fragmentation aspect to be 
replaced, while another asks for it to be removed. There will 
clearly be different outcomes depending on the execution order of 
these two requests—and furthermore the outcomes might be dif-
ferent at different nodes.  
Unauthorised nodes initiating reconfiguration. Reconfiguration 
messages may be spoofed by malicious nodes in an attempt to 
directly and deliberately compromise consistency. 
2.2 Compositional threats 
These relate to faulty interactions, following reconfiguration, 
between the newly-reconfigured entities and prior non-
reconfigured entities. The associated threats typically involve 
conflicts and dependencies: conflicts are threats causing negative 
interactions between system entities; while a dependency threat 
relates to a ‘required’ relationship that needs to be associated with 
the reconfiguration for the system to operate correctly. The differ-
ent compositional threats are: 
Unsynchronised weaving of dependent aspects. Some aspects are 
inherently dependent on each other; for example, decryption is 
dependent on encryption, and a cache may be dependent on a 
remote cache manager. Therefore the order in which aspects are 
woven is crucial: e.g., we must ensure that an assembler aspect is 
put in place before its associated fragmenter, otherwise frag-
mented messages may be received which cannot be handled. 
Unsynchronised binding of distributed aspects. Some distributed 
aspect systems employ ‘remote aspects’ which are used by several 
distributed client nodes. If such an aspect, e.g. a cache manager is 
removed without the consent or even the awareness of its client 
nodes, errors can arise when clients attempt to communicate with 
the aspect.  
Mutual exclusion of aspects. Behavioural conflicts can occur as 
new aspects are woven. For example adding a logging aspect into 
our scenario at the same join points as an encryption aspect can 
result in behavioural conflicts, because the system is open to read 
the logged, decrypted messages. 
3. The AO-OpenCom Framework 
Before discussing our proposed distributed consistency frame-
work, we briefly introduce the software composition technology 
that underlies our work. AO-OpenCom is an extension of the 
OpenCom component model [5] and provides a distributed AO 
composition service while allowing aspectual compositions to be 
dynamically reconfigured. An earlier version of AO-OpenCom 
was the subject of a prior workshop paper [16]. We revisit it here 
because the current version differs significantly from the earlier 
one in key areas.  
3.1 Aspects and Aspect Composition.  
Aspect composition in AO-OpenCom employs components to 
play the role of aspects—i.e. an aspect is simply an OpenCom 
component (hereafter we use the term aspect-component when 
referring to an OpenCom component that is playing the role of an 
aspect). Aspects are composed using so-called AO-connectors. 
These are specialised connectors that support the run-time inser-
tion of aspect-components.  
 Internally, an instance of AO-OpenCom is structured as a set 
of per-node local instances, as illustrated in figure 2, which are 
combined into a multi-node AO-OpenCom distributed system. 
The Distribution Framework is a plug-in for the AO-OpenCom 
communication service that sends reconfiguration and manage-
ment messages to every node in the system; the ISend interface 
provides a send() operation, while its INotify interface delivers 
received messages to the AO-OpenCom Configurator.  
Turning now to the constituent components, the Configurator 
is responsible for accepting and handling reconfiguration requests 
from applications. It interacts with the Pointcut Evaluator and 
Advice Handler components on either the local node or other 
nodes to actually carry out the requested reconfiguration in terms 
of AO (re)compositions. The Aspect Repository holds a set of 
instantiable aspect-components. This is composed of a front-end 
proxy gateway component and a back-end database component. 
Finally, the Pointcut Evaluator evaluates pointcuts and returns a 
list of matching join points within the framework; and the Aspect 
Handler weaves advices at these join points in the framework. 
 
Figure 2. An AO-OpenCom per node instance 
3.2 Reconfiguration in AO-OpenCom 
The main API provided by an AO-OpenCom for dynamic recon-
figuration takes the form of a single operation on the Configurator 
component:  
Configurator.reconfigure(target_dcf, pc, command, aspect, scope, 
locus).  
The target_dcf argument specifies which distributed system the 
reconfiguration should be applied to. The pc argument specifies a 
pointcut that picks out the join points at which the desired recon-
figuration should occur. The command argument offers options—
either ‘add’, ‘remove’, or ‘replace’ an aspect—for the action to be 
taken at the indentified join points. The aspect argument can be a 
direct reference to a local aspect-component, or an indirect refer-
ence to an aspect stored in an Aspect Repository, or a reference to 
an already-instantiated remotely-accessible singleton aspect. The 
scope argument can be either per-instance or per-distributed sys-
tem. The former weaves a distinct aspect-component instance at 
each specified join point; the latter instantiates a single per-system 
instance that is connected, potentially remotely, with each speci-
fied join point. Finally, the locus argument describes how advices 
should be applied at a selected join point in terms of either before, 
after or around. 
Furthermore, the Configurator is also responsible for the man-
agement of quiescence (i.e. it ensures that the weaving/unweaving 
of aspects is not carried out while affected component/aspect-
components/connectors are actively processing calls). To support 
this, the Configurator ensures that the weaving of aspects is not 
carried out while the relevant connectors or other components are 
actively passing or processing messages or calls. To do this, it 
requires that all connectors and components support a basic 
‘quiescence’ interface as follows: 
status = quiesce( timeout); 
status = resume(); 
Because of the strictly stylised composition supported by AO 
composition, achieving quiescence is a relatively straightforward 
task compared to non-AO composition (e.g. [8]). The quiesce() 
operation simply freezes the start of the chain of aspects attached 
to the AO Connector (i.e. the AO-Connectors that correspond to 
the advices of the woven aspects) to prevent new threads entering, 
and then waits for any currently executing threads to drain from 
the aspect chain. 
To execute Configurator.reconfigure() the following distri-
buted protocol is performed: 
1. Configurator.reconfigure() is called on one of the AO-
OpenCom nodes; we will refer to this node as the ‘initiator’.  
2. The initiator determines how the aspect is to be applied. In the 
case of a per-distributed system scope, it instantiates the as-
pect at a suitable node and sends a remote reference to this to 
the nodes where it is to be woven. Otherwise, the initiator de-
cides if it has the specified aspect available locally (or can get 
it from an Aspect Repository) and wants to send it ‘by value’ 
to the nodes where it is to be woven, or if it wants to send the 
aspect ‘by name’ and implicitly instruct the other members to 
obtain the aspect from an Aspect Repository.  
3. The initiator sends a ‘reconfigure’ message to all the other 
AO-OpenCom nodes. This contains the parameters originally 
passed to Configurator.reconfigure().  
4. Upon receiving a ‘reconfigure’ message, each node’s Pointcut 
Evaluator locates the target join points within its scope.  
5. Each node’s Aspect Handler then actions the ‘add’, ‘remove’ 
or ‘replace’ command as appropriate. For ‘add’ or ‘replace’, 
this may involve obtaining the aspect from an Aspect Reposi-
tory. It will also involve weaving the aspect according to the 
specified scope and locus.  
6. Each node replies to the initiator that it has completed the 
reconfiguration locally. 
7. When all nodes have reported completion the initiator node 
returns control to the caller of reconfigure(). 
An example of the use of Configurator.reconfigure() is given in 
Section 5.2. 
4. The Consistency Framework 
In this section we discuss our approach to the support of consis-
tent dynamic reconfiguration. This is independent of the basic 
AO-OpenCom reconfiguration architecture discussed in the above 
section which handles only the basic mechanics of dynamic aspect 
(un)deployment. The Consistency Framework (COF) illustrated in 
Figure 3 consists of: a System Consistency Framework, a Compo-
sitional Consistency Framework and a set of ‘threat aspects’ 
which are responsible for guarding against consistency threats 
such as those identified in Section 2; these threat aspects are wo-
ven into the lower-level frameworks using the usual AO-
OpenCom facilities.  
The fundamental strategy of the COF is to guard against con-
sistency threats by deploying ‘threat aspects’ at appropriate join 
points within AO-OpenCom itself. The benefit of this strategy is 
that threats can be handled in an incremental, selective and ex-
tensible manner where specific threat aspects can be deployed to 
guard against specific consistency threats. Crucially, we are using 
the same approach to guard against consistency as we are for ‘or-
dinary’ application-level dynamic reconfiguration: i.e. using as-
pect composition. 
Turning now to the detail, the Consistency Configurator is re-
sponsible for managing these threat aspects and for deploying 
them at appropriate join points within the AO-OpenCom-based 
distributed system (see below).  
 
Figure 3. Applying Consistency Framework to AO-OpenCom 
We now turn to a discussion of how the Consistency Configurator 
resolves each of the threats discussed in Section 2 by deploying 
appropriate threat aspects. When discussing the weaving of threat 
aspects, the following paragraphs refer to the numbered join 
points, 1-7, within the AO-OpenCom framework that are illu-
strated in Figure 3.  
4.1 Addressing System Environment Threats 
The Consistency Configurator uses the System Consistency 
Framework to instantiate the appropriate system environment 
threat aspects based on the reconfiguration needs as described in 
this section. 
Protocol Message Disruption. To ensure that reconfiguration 
messages are not lost, the System Consistency Framework uses a 
reliability threat aspect and this aspect is woven at join points 4 
and 5. The reliability threat aspect implements a reliability proto-
col atop the Distribution Framework to ensure that all messages 
are reliably received by each member. Because it is implemented 
as an aspect, this behaviour can be realised using various underly-
ing mechanisms and can therefore be made straightforwardly 
applicable to a variety of implementation environments. This 
point is an important one and also applies to all the other threat 
resolution aspects to be discussed below. 
In more detail, our currently-implemented reliability threat 
aspect is composed of an aspect with two advices and a ‘message 
store’. The first advice is woven ‘before’ join point 5, and has the 
task of piggybacking reliability information to the message before 
it is sent via the ISend interface. The second advice is woven as a 
‘before’ advice at join point 4 (i.e. before the message is delivered 
to the Configurator via INotify); this monitors incoming messages 
(and caches them in the message store), detects any losses within 
the transmission sequence, and requests retransmission of lost 
messages.  
To weave the reliability threat aspect in a consistent manner 
(this again applies also to all the other threat resolution aspects to 
be discussed below) the quiesce() operation is first called on the 
connectors at join points 4 and 5 by the Consistency Configurator. 
Upon successfully achieving quiescence, the reliability threat 
aspect is woven at the front of the advice chain list (for brevity, 
we discuss this weaving process only for join point 5; see Figure 
4); hence, it is invoked before method calls go to the Distribution 
Framework. Once the reliability threat aspect have been success-
fully woven at both join points, the resume() operation is called by 
the Consistency  Configurator. 
 
Figure 4. Weaving the reliability threat aspect at join point 5 
Local Node Disruption Threat. To guard against this threat, the 
System Consistency Framework instantiates a consensus threat 
aspect and this aspect is woven at join points 4 and 5 to ensure 
that local node failures or disruptions do not compromise the con-
sistency of the system. This aspect is ‘flexible’ in that it can im-
plement any one of a range transaction protocols [7] depending on 
the specific requirements and deployment environment. To illus-
trate the operation of the advices we briefly describe our two-
phase commit implementation. In this implementation, a ‘before’ 
advice woven at join point 5 takes messages before they are sent 
and converts them into the required sequence of messages for 
two-phase commit. Correspondingly, the ‘around’ advice at join 
point 4 receives these transaction protocol messages and sends 
phase acknowledgements; it also communicates with the AO-
OpenCom Configurator to enact or undo the local reconfiguration 
as appropriate.  
Infrastructure Service Failures Threat. To guarantee the liveness 
of the infrastructure services (e.g. the Aspect Repository), the 
System Consistency Framework uses a replication aspect. This 
aspect is woven at join point 6 as an ‘around’ advice. Based on 
application requirements, a number of replication algorithms 
could be used to ensure maximum aspect availability and consis-
tency during updates—e.g. the Coda [15] or Bayou [6] algorithms. 
More advanced algorithms which consider specific application 
and context requirements could also be used: e.g. Beloued [2].  
Further, the System Consistency Framework uses a load ba-
lancer aspect to manage the load across the infrastructure services 
and this aspect is woven at join point 6 as a ‘before’ advice. Our 
current load balancer algorithm implements both the push and pull 
migration approaches [11]. The detailed functionality of the load 
balancing algorithm is beyond the scope of the paper; but, in brief, 
with push migration, periodic checks are made on the load of 
particular replicated repository loads, and as imbalances are found 
the load is evenly distributed from overloaded to less busy reposi-
tories. And the pull technique arranges that an idle replicated re-
pository can transparently take tasks from a busy repository.  
To prevent version conflicts in the Aspect Repository, the 
System Consistency Framework uses a concurrency management 
aspect. This aspect is woven as a ‘before’ advice at join point 7. 
The concurrency mechanism uses an optimistic read/write locking 
mechanism with priority for readers. Calls to update an aspect 
instance/version in the repository access the lock as a writer such 
that a writer can access the lock when there are no readers, while 
calls to retrieve aspect instances access the lock as a reader.  
Simultaneous Reconfiguration Threat. To ensure that simultane-
ous reconfiguration requests do not interfere with one another, the 
System Consistency Framework uses a distributed read/write 
concurrency aspect and is woven at join point 1. This is an 
‘around’ advice, the ‘before’ part being activated before the Con-
figurator.reconfigure() is called. The advice then attempts to 
access the framework’s lock set by the concurrency aspect, and 
blocks the call until this is obtained, at which point the reconfigu-
ration can proceed. At this point, any reconfiguration attempts by 
other nodes are blocked until the present reconfiguration is com-
plete, at which point the Configurator returns the reconfigure() 
call, and the ‘after’ part of the ‘around’ advice releases the lock. 
Unauthorised Reconfiguration Threat. To prevent unauthorised 
nodes initiating reconfiguration, the System Consistency frame-
work uses a series of security aspects, which are subsequently 
woven at join points 4 and 5. These comprise aspects that each 
addresses a different flavour of security threat: e.g. access control, 
integrity or confidentiality. The weaving order of these aspects is 
crucial: of the three mentioned the order would be authentication, 
confidentiality and then integrity.  
Currently, an authentication aspect is woven as a ‘before’ ad-
vice at join point 5 such that it is called before the Distribution 
Framework and performs access control before allowing continua-
tion. Then a confidentiality aspect encrypts the arguments of 
method calls as they are passed through the Distribution Frame-
work. This is achieved by weaving an encryption advice as a ‘be-
fore’ advice at join point 5 and a decryption advice at join point 4, 
also as a ‘before’ advice. Finally the System Consistency Frame-
work implements an integrity aspect in terms of an SSL layer 
between reconfigured nodes.  
4.2 Addressing Compositional Threat 
The Consistency Configurator uses the Compositional Consisten-
cy Framework to instantiate the appropriate compositional threat 
aspects based on the reconfiguration needs as described below. 
Unsynchronised Weaving of dependent aspect Threat. The 
Compositional Consistency Framework uses a transaction man-
agement concurrency protocol or coordination protocol to pre-
serve compositional dependencies. Each of the protocols is 
encapsulated as an aspect and is woven as a ‘before’ advice at join 
points 4 and 5. This process is equivalent to that used for threat 2. 
Here, the Saga transaction model [7] allows dependent aspects to 
be divided into a sequence of sub-transactional aspects, each of 
which manages an associated compensating sub-transaction that 
can be triggered to undo the effects of the committed sub-
transaction aspect in case one fails.  
With respect to the coordination protocol, protocol the Com-
positional Consistency Framework uses the NeCoMan [9] proto-
col which is encapsulated as an aspect and woven to provide 
synchronisation between the reconfigured entities.  
Unsynchronised binding of distributed remote aspects. To pre-
vent race conditions in which remote connectors attempt to com-
municate with remote aspects that have previously been removed, 
a ‘before’ advice is woven at join point 3. This detects when a 
‘remove’ command is passed to the Aspect Handler, and in re-
sponse weaves a proxy caretaker aspect this is woven in front of 
proxies for the removed application aspect. Then, when a remote 
client (connector) attempts to invoke this removed aspect, the 
proxy caretaker aspect is invoked instead which redirects and 
informs the remote connector that the referenced aspect has been 
removed. To avoid the connector from invoking the aspect in the 
future, it removes the remote aspect reference from its aspect 
chain when it receives the ‘remove reference’ message. 
Mutual exclusion of Aspect(s) Threat. To ensure that conflicting 
aspects are not composed, the Compositional Consistency 
Framework uses a semantic reasoning and resolution aspect (e.g. 
[17]) and is applied at join points 1 and 4. This aspect holds appli-
cation-specific rules about which mutual exclusive behaviours are 
allowed and not allowed when reconfiguration (both addition and 
removal of aspects) is performed. Using reflection, it identifies 
aspect(s) woven at the join point and determines if adding or re-
moving the aspect will cause any inconsistencies. For detected 
conflicts an exception is raised and the reconfiguration is aborted.  
4.3 Ordering of Threat Aspects 
Although the threats discussed above are essentially orthogonal to 
one another, the order in which the corresponding aspects are 
composed is still important. For example, when the consensus 
aspect is woven at join points 4 and 5, the reconfiguration can 
proceed in either of the following ways: (i) if no threat aspects are 
deployed then the consensus aspect is then woven as a ‘before’ 
advice; or (ii) in the case where the threat 1 aspect has already 
been woven, the consensus aspect is woven as a ‘before’ advice 
with position 2. The decision is determined from priority ordering 
information attached as attributes to the individual aspects. Weav-
ing the reliability aspect first ensures that a reliable consensus 
protocol is selected.  
The order in which aspects woven at the same join point are 
invoked affects the reconfiguration semantics. This is particularly 
true for join points 4 and 5 at which numerous aspects are woven. 
Aspects being executed in the wrong order could lead to situations 
in which a message needing to be processed by a particular aspect 
has already been consumed by another.  
To guard against such eventualities, the COF mandates a par-
ticular order for the weaving of the threat aspects. These are illu-
strated in Figures 6(a) and 6(b) which respectively illustrate the 
required ordering at join points 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 6(a). List of threat aspects woven at join point 4 
 
Figure 6(b). List of threat aspects woven at join point 5 
5. Evaluation 
We focus on two dimensions of evaluation: (i) the extent to which 
AO-OpenCom/COF achieves our stated goals of configurability 
and transparency; and (ii) the overhead of AO-OpenCom/COF in 
‘typical’ usage scenarios.  
5.1 Configurability  
In Section 4.1 we have already demonstrated the configurability 
of AO-OpenCom/COF in addressing a wide range of consistency 
threats. Our general approach to dealing with such threats—i.e. by 
selectively applying threat aspects to join points in AO-OpenCom 
itself—is inherently highly configurable and can be changed or 
extended simply by applying different threat aspects. However, 
two potential vulnerabilities of our approach might become evi-
dent if new threat aspects are added to the set we have already 
identified: (i) it could become harder to keep track of the threat 
aspect ordering constraints discussed in Section 4.2; and (ii) there 
could be an increased possibility of undesirable interactions be-
tween the behaviour of the different threat aspects. The extent to 
which these vulnerabilities become problematic will become 
clearer with experience. However, we believe that the set of threat 
aspects we have identified is already quite comprehensive, and 
that many cases can be covered with the current set alone. Under-
lying this belief is our experience that most threats seem to reduce 
to a tractable number of common underlying patterns. 
5.2 Transparency 
Turning now to the issue of transparency, AO-OpenCom/COF 
naturally supports a selectively transparent approach. At one ex-
treme, an appropriate set of threat aspects can be pre-configured at 
application start-up time so that the application programmer who 
wishes to initiate a run-time reconfiguration needs only to make 
the appropriate call to Configurator.reconfigure(). This achieves 
complete transparency of consistency-related mechanisms. At the 
other extreme, the programmer can be explicit about which threat 
aspects should be put in place for each reconfiguration. In this 
case, COF will apply the requested threat aspects on-the-fly (if 
they are not already present) before proceeding to perform the 
requested reconfiguration. Note that this extreme is still partially 
transparent as the programmer is protected by the Consistency 
Configurator from the low level details of actually weaving the 
threat aspects.  
To illustrate the partially transparent case consider a reconfi-
guration scenario relating to the case study in Section 2. Assume 
that the application programmer wants to add an MPEG4 video 
codec aspect to all nodes in domains 1 and 2 which already have 
video-codec components with an IMPEG interface. Further as-
sume that domains 1 and 2 offer reliable TCP-based communica-
tions. The programmer would specify the reconfiguration request 
by writing code along the lines of Figure 7 (the code is simplified 
for presentational purposes).  
Note that the required threat aspects are specified as part of 
the aspect specification. In this case no compositional threats are 
applicable, and the protocol message disruptions threat (T1) is not 
applicable either because of the availability of TCP. This leaves 
only the remainder of the ‘system environment’ threats: i.e. 
threats T2-T5. The Configurator.reconfigure() call takes the given 
pointcut and aspect specifications and also specifies that the speci-
fied aspect should be added, that the scope of the reconfiguration 
should be the entire DCF and that the weaving locus should be 
before.  
Pointcut pc = new Pointcut( “domain1* && domain2*”, “video-
codec*”, “IMPEG”,  “video-player*”); 
Aspect aspectVideo = new Aspect(MPEG4VideoCodec, “T2 T3  
T4 T5”);  
Configurator.reconfigure(multimedia_app, pc, add, aspectVideo, 
perDCF, before); 
Figure 7. Reconfiguration specification 
5.3 COF Overhead 
The following experiment was performed on two Core Duo 2, 1.8 
GHZ PCs’ with 2GB RAM running Windows, and using the Java-
based version of AO-OpenCom. Each measurement was repeated 
ten times and mean values taken to discount anomalous results. 
The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate the performance 
overhead of dynamic reconfiguration operations using AO-
OpenCom and COF, We approached this by instrumenting an 
implementation of the application scenario described in Section 
5.2, while using different threat aspect configurations from the 
consistency framework.  
The results are shown in Figure 8 which shows the measured 
overhead of the following 4 cases: (i) reconfiguration without 
COF; (ii) reconfiguration using COF with the system consistency 
framework threat aspects only; (iii) COF with the compositional 
consistency framework threat aspects only; and (iv) COF with 
both the system and compositional consistency framework threat 
aspects.  
We can see a linear increase in overhead when applying COF for 
compositional threat aspect while a non-linear increase of over-
head for System Consistency Threat aspect used as the number of 
reconfigured nodes is increased. This is explained by: 
• the fact that the initiator node is a bottleneck (this could in 
principle be alleviated by configuring AO-OpenCom with 
slave Configurators to increase parallelism); 
• weaving of dependent aspects are treated as sub-transactions 
over a mixed set of nodes. The set of affected nodes having 
dependent causes affected nodes to dependent on each other, 
causing the overhead to be higher. 
Overall, based on our experiments, we can conclude that the run-
time overhead of COF is acceptable; with each threat aspect capa-
ble of being independently woven each threat aspect can be 
individually deployed based on the required reconfiguration con-
text, thus significantly reducing the overhead compared to all 
threat aspects being deployed. 
 
 
Figure 8. Overhead of reconfiguration using COF in AO-
OpenCom 
6. Related Work 
Few AO middleware platforms have addressed the challenges of 
performing consistent dynamic reconfiguration. DyMac [10], and 
CAM/DAOP [14] are prominent examples of distributed AOP 
platforms that have no support for dynamic reconfiguration. Other 
prominent platforms such as Spring AOP [1] and FAC [13] do 
support reconfiguration, but do not support distribution; these 
systems have not needed to consider strong consistency mechan-
isms as reconfiguration is considerably simpler when confined to 
a single node.  
JAC [12] is an early example of a distributed platform that 
supports dynamic reconfiguration. However, this support involves 
only the reconfiguration of advices at individual join points and 
provides no support for distributed consistency management.  
AWED [3] supports dynamic weaving of aspects using the 
DJAsCo [20] distributed AOP architecture. It supports the weav-
ing of stateful distributed aspects, and through the use of a consis-
tency protocol ensures that whenever an aspect is woven at a 
specific host, mirrors are also woven at other involved hosts. 
However, AWED do not consider any other consistency threats as 
discussed in the our proposed solution.  
ReflexD [18] also supports dynamic weaving/unweaving of 
mirrored aspects, and uses a framework to provide system-wide 
consistency. However, as in AWED ReflexD aspects exist only as 
mirrored aspects although unlike AWED, ReflexD ensures that 
whenever an aspect is changed the corresponding remote copies 
are synchronised. But again, the consistency mechanisms pro-
vided do not generalise to the extent of our proposal. 
Finally, DyReS [19] is an AO middleware framework devel-
oped on top of JBOSS dynamic AOP [4] and Spring AOP [1] that 
provides consistent dynamic reconfiguration in a more sophisti-
cated manner than the systems reviewed above. More specifically, 
DyReS uses a coordination protocol that allows aspects to be dy-
namically added and removed in a consistent manner by achieving 
quiescence. The protocol is based on two synchronisation primi-
tives: wait blocks the ongoing reconfiguration process until it gets 
a notify message from a specified node; and notify sends a syn-
chronisation message to a specified node. Although this approach 
supports a degree of generality (i.e. it is portable over multiple 
underlying platforms), it again does not generalise to a wider set 
of consistency threats. For example, when deployed in a wireless 
network environment there is no way to address the possibility of 
lost or reordered synchronisation messages or other system envi-
roment threats as in our approach. Furthermore, compositional 
threats are not addressed in DyReS. Our approach is more flexi-
ble, allowing different consensus and consistency protocols to be 
chosen based on the required reconfiguration, the current envi-
ronment, and the wide range of threats that are posed.  
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we have identified a number of important threats to 
maintaining the consistency of distributed reconfiguration opera-
tions in AO middleware environments. We believe these threats to 
be representative of the type of threats that should be considered 
by all dynamic AOP platforms. More specifically, we have pre-
sented the AO-OpenCom platform which supports the composi-
tion and reconfiguration of distributed aspects, and an associated 
distributed consistency framework called COF that ensures that all 
of the identified threats are handled in a transparent manner. COF 
has the following important benefits. First, it is simple and elegant 
in that it uses aspect composition to deploy these consistency 
mechanisms. Second, it is flexible and configurable in that appro-
priate threat aspects can be dynamically woven and unwoven 
according to the types of threat and environmental conditions 
currently pertaining. Third, it is inherently extensible in that new 
threat aspects can be developed and woven into the system at 
appropriate join points as and when new threats are identified. 
Fourth, it achieves the maintenance of consistency with a reason-
able overhead compared to unsafe reconfiguration. 
There are several research directions that we would like to in-
vestigate in the future. First, we are currently working on perfor-
mance optimisations to reduce reconfiguration overheads through 
the use of multiple (slave) Configurators in cases where a reconfi-
guration needs to be carried out on a large number of nodes. This 
should reduce the overheads identified in Section 5 to something 
closer to constant time. Second, we will investigate the potential 
for embedding our approach in a self-managing, autonomic envi-
ronment. Finally, we plan to integrate our framework with appro-
priate modelling tools which can support the developer in 
designing, evaluating and validating complex aspect reconfigura-
tions before they are deployed into a distributed system.  
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